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Lying and Team Incentives
* 
 
We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-
rates and team incentives, on participants’ inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental 
setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team 
incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature 
of these compensation schemes. 
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Deception and lying is common in all kinds of social interaction (Bok, 1999; Feldman, 2009)
and recently, this topic also raised considerable interest in the experimental economics lit-
erature (Croson, 2005). Gneezy (2005), for example, investigates the role of consequences
on the inclination of lying and ﬁnds that people deceive more often the higher the own
proﬁt from lying and the lower the loss for the deceived person (for an extension see Sutter,
2009). Schweitzer and Hsee (2002) point out that people tend to justify lying more eas-
ily when other people beneﬁt from dishonest behavior. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
identify guilt aversion as an important inhibitor to tame the temptation of deceiving oth-
ers. In a simple and ingenious die-rolling game Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), henceforth
F&H, ﬁnd that people systematically over-report the true value of a private die-roll when
the reported number determines their individual pay. Interestingly, people seem not to
exaggerate their claims to the full extent what the authors call ‘incomplete lying’. This
result is in line with the idea of ‘self-concept maintenance’ investigated by Mazar, Amir,
and Ariely (2008). They argue that lying to a small extent does not necessarily require
changing one’s self-image as an honest person.
In this paper we take an organizational economics perspective and look at the inﬂuence
of compensation schemes on deceptive behavior and lying. Such a perspective is also taken
by Cadsby, Song, and Tapon (2010) who employ an anagram task and experimentally
analyze the diﬀerences in cheating under piece-rate, target-based and tournament incentive
schemes. They ﬁnd that lying in terms of overclaimed words is most pronounced under
the target-based system as targets seem to encourage people to lie particularly if one
is close to the target. By following up on their work in the current study we compare
lying behavior under the two probably most commonly observed incentive schemes in
organizations, i.e., individual piece-rate compensation and team compensation schemes
(Gibbons, 1998; Lazear and Gibbs, 2009). We use a variant of the die-rolling game of
F&H that resembles an individual piece-rate compensation scheme, i.e., for each unit of
her random production output the agent receives one compensation unit. We are able to
conﬁrm F&H’s ﬁndings, i.e., people systematically lie but quite often they are reluctant to
do so to the full extent. Our team compensation scheme is modeled as a revenue sharing
mechanism (see, for example, Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997), i.e., the random production
output of two agents is pooled and each agent receives one half of a compensation unit for
each unit of the joint production output. Comparing the incentives to lie under the two
schemes reveals that under the team compensation scheme the marginal gain from lying,
i.e., the return from exaggerating the own production output by one unit, is only half of
the marginal gain from lying under the individual piece-rate scheme. This could lead one
to assume that lying should be more pronounced under the individual piece-rate scheme
than under the team incentive scheme. On the other hand, lying under the team incentive
scheme is not exclusively beneﬁcial for oneself - as it is the case under the individual
compensation scheme - but it also beneﬁts the other agent in the team. Thus, an agent
under a team incentive scheme might be more able to justify such a white lie to herself
compared to a lie under the individual scheme - after all she is doing something ‘good’ for
2the other team member. The two lines of reasoning point into diﬀerent directions whether
lying is more severe under an individual than a team incentive scheme. Our data indicates
that lying is in fact more pronounced under the team incentives than under the individual
piece-rate scheme.
2 Experiment
Our experiment employed a simple one shot decision task closely resembling the baseline
treatment of F&H. Due to the short nature of this task we followed their procedure in
conducting the experiment after several diﬀerent other experiments. In all sessions we col-
lected observations for both treatments by randomly assigning participants to treatments.
The sessions were run in the laboratories of the University Bonn and the University of
Cologne between August 2010 and January 2011 and involved 288 subjects (with a mean
age of 24 and 42 % being female). At the end of each experiment we asked subjects to
ﬁll in a questionnaire for a statistical survey for which they would be rewarded indepen-
dently of the preceding experiment.1 A separate instruction sheet explained that their pay
would be based on ‘points’ pi that were randomly determined, i.e., by rolling a standard
6-sided die. By introducing points we slightly adapted the framing of the F&H setting.
The reason was that we were particulary interested in investigating lying under diﬀerent
compensation schemes. In this paper we refer to the points also as ‘random production
output’. In both treatments the points pi of subject i equaled the number di shown on
the die if di ∈ {1,...,5}. If di = 6, i.e., a 6 was diced, points pi were set to 0. Subjects
were randomly assigned to the two treatments that diﬀered in the way their points, i.e.,
random production outputs, were translated into payoﬀs of πi. The treatment Individual
closely resembled the baseline treatment in F&H, i.e., the payoﬀ of agent i was deﬁned as
πi = pi. In the treatment Team a subject i was randomly and anonymously matched with
a diﬀerent subject j to form a team. Team-member i’s individual payoﬀ was calculated
according to the following sharing rule: πi = 1/2 · (pi + pj). Team-member j’s payoﬀ was
exactly the same, i.e., πj = πi. It should be emphasized that we designed the two incentive
schemes such that they were comparable with respect to two important characteristics.
First, the expected payoﬀ of a subject was 2.5 under both schemes if one assumes that all
subjects honestly reported their true numbers. Secondly, if all subjects behaved selﬁshly
and maximally exaggerated their numbers they earned 5 under both incentive schemes.
Subjects were instructed to privately role a die in their cubicles and to jot down the
appearing number on a sheet of paper that was handed out to the subjects and collected
afterwards.2 Finally, subjects ﬁlled in the questionnaire. At the end of the session partic-
ipants were privately paid πi with a conversion rate of 1 e.
1The questionnaire contained questions about gender and personality measured by a 10-item Big
Five inventory covering the traits openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism
(Rammstedt and John, 2007).
2To be more precise we asked them to jot down the very ﬁrst number that appeared on the die. In
fact we followed the procedure of F&H and explicitly allowed the subjects to roll the die several times. As
F&H we argued that by doing so they could assure themselves of the die being fair.
33 Hypotheses
We are primarily interested in whether agents are more inclined to lie under one of the two
incentive schemes. As mentioned earlier two competing hypothesis are at hand. The ﬁrst
one relates to the fact that the marginal gain from lying is higher under the individual
piece-rate scheme than under the team incentives. This leads us to our ﬁrst hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Lying is more often observed under the individual piece-rate
incentive scheme than under the team incentive scheme.
On the other hand, under a team incentive scheme a liar has the excuse that lying comes
with doing something good for the other member of the team, i.e., a lie is partly a white
lie. Such an excuse is not available under the individual piece-rate incentive scheme. This
results in our second hypothesis.3
Hypothesis 2: Lying is more often observed under the team incentive scheme
than under the individual piece-rate incentive scheme.
To see which of the two hypotheses can be supported we have to turn to our data.
4 Results
Our main results are summarized in Figure 1 and in Table 1. In the ﬁgure we see the
distribution of reported production outputs of our two treatments (black bars). Rolling
fair dices should generate a uniform distribution of production outputs (dashed line) and
an average of actual production output of 2.5.
The left side of the Figure 1 shows the results of our treatment Individual. For compar-
ative reasons the grey bars indicate the results of the baseline treatment of F&H. Visual
inspection already reveals that the results of our treatment Individual are very similar to
their results. A comparison to our team treatment provides insights regarding our research
question.
Observation 1: Reported production outputs are signiﬁcantly higher in treat-
ment Team than in treatment Individual.
While subjects report on average 3.31 under individual incentives, in the treatment Team
participants report on average 3.86. A Mann-Whitney-U-test (MWU-test) comparing the
distribution of reported production outputs between both treatments reveals that subjects
report signiﬁcantly higher production outputs in the treatment Team than in treatment
Individual (p=.003, two-sided).4 The observation that subjects are more inclined to lie
3An additional reason why agents might be more inclined to lie under a team incentive scheme is that
in general it is less obvious who of the two team members actually lied. This might also have played a
role in our experiment since the earnings were paid out by one of the experimenters and being paid a high
amount makes it more likely that lying is involved.
4F&H report an average of 3.52 e in their baseline treatment. The distributions of numbers in F&H’s
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Figure 1: Relative frequency of reported production outputs in diﬀerent treatments.
under the team incentive scheme is also supported, when comparing the frequencies of the
maximal possible exaggeration, i.e., a reported production output of 5.
Observation 2: A production output of 5 is reported more often in treatment
Team than in Treatment Individual.
This observation is can be backed by a χ2-test (p=.014, two-sided). A pairwise com-
parison of all numbers reported is shown in Table 1. In line with the ﬁndings of F&H we
also observe that lying is ‘incomplete’ in our two treatments.
Observation 3: Incomplete lying is observed in both treatments, Team and
Individual.
Support for this observation is shown in Table 1. The results indicate that in both
treatments the frequencies of reported production of 4 signiﬁcantly exceed the frequency
that one would expect from honest subjects. While in both treatments 0, 1 and 2 are
reported signiﬁcantly less often, only the frequency of the production output of 3 under
individual incentives cannot be distinguished from the relative frequency of 1/6.
Relating gender and personality traits (elicited by the questionnaire) with the produc-
tion outputs reported by the respective subjects unveils some interesting further insights
on potential determinants of lying. In the treatment Individual women report signiﬁcantly
lower production outputs (mean women: 2.95, mean men: 3.64, MWU-test, p=.025, two-
sided) which is in line with the ﬁndings of Dreber and Johannesson (2008). A corresponding
gender diﬀerence cannot be observed in the treatment Team (mean women: 3.58, mean
men: 4.02, MWU-test, p=.274, two-sided). When pooling the data of our two treatments
we see that women report a production output of zero signiﬁcantly more often than men
(χ2-test, p=.007, two-sided). Recall, that reporting a zero is a strong indicator of honesty
5Treatment n Av. pi Reported production output pi (rel. frequencies)
0 1 2 3 4 5
F&H 389 3.52 .064 −−− .072 −−− .116 −−− .126 −−− .272 +++ .350 +++
∨ ∧ ∧
∗ ∨ ∧ ∨ ∨
Individual 156 3.31 .083 −−− .122 − .083 −−− .135
n.s. .263 +++ .314 +++
∧
∗∗∗ ∨ ∨
∗∗ ∧ ∨ ∧ ∧
∗∗
Team 132 3.86 .039 −−− .053 −−− .098 −− .083 −−− .273 +++ .455 +++
Table 1: Plus and minus signs display the signiﬁcance of a one-sided binomial test indicating that the








+++)=1 %-level, n.s. = not signiﬁcant). Stars display the signiﬁcance of a two-sided
χ
2-test indicating that there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the treatment and a dummy




since it results in a payoﬀ of zero. To check for the inﬂuence of personality we ran a linear
regression explaining the reported production output pi. We ﬁnd that extraversion and
neuroticism have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on reported production outputs (extraver-
sion .263, p=.012; neuroticism .257, p=.017).5 In this regression the coeﬃcient for women
turns out to be signiﬁcantly negative (Women -.709, p=.001).
5 Concluding remarks
We investigate the inﬂuence of two widespread compensation schemes on agents inclina-
tion to lie. By employing a simple experimental design introduced by Fischbacher and
Heusi (2008) we ﬁnd that lying is prevalent under both schemes but more pronounced
under team incentives than individual piece-rates. This ﬁnding highlights a so far fairly
neglected feature of compensation schemes. It shows that organizations are well advised
to be vigilant regarding potentially harming side-eﬀects of compensation schemes. Agents
working under team incentives might be particularly prone to lying and deception because
a culprit can more easily convince herself to lie by arguing that the intention of lying was
actually a good one, i.e., to beneﬁt the other team members. There might also be other
reasons, e.g., in general it is easier to hide individual wrongdoing under a team than an
individual compensation scheme which makes it more diﬃcult to pinpoint a liar in teams.
Further research is needed to unambiguously identify the exact mechanisms behind the
observation that lying is more prevalent under team incentives than individual piece-rates.
5The coeﬃcients and p-values are obtained by running an OLS-regression with robust standard errors
that controls for treatments, gender and personality traits. In fact we had to leave out the personality
trait ‘agreeableness’ because the internal consistency of the questions intended to measure this facet was
not suﬃcient (Cronbach’s alpha for the ﬁve facets were: openness .51, conscientiousness .51, extraversion
.69, agreeableness .08, neuroticism .58).
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7Appendix
Instructions of the Experiment (translated from German)
Statistical Survey
For a statistical survey (independent of the previous experiment) we ask you to answer
some brief questions. To determine your payment for answering the upcoming questions,
we ask you to roll a die. If you roll a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 you receive the diced number as
points. If you roll a 6 you receive 0 points. The following applies to you:
{[Individual] For answering the questions, the points will be paid to you in Euro.}
{[Team] Another participant will be randomly assigned to you. The points of this partic-
ipant and your points will be added up. For answering the questions, you and the other
participant each will be paid half of the sum of these points in Euro.}
Now, please dice your number (the number diced at the ﬁrst time counts; afterwards you
can roll the die several times to check if the die is really fair). Now enter the diced number
that you have rolled at the ﬁrst time: ____
When you are ready, please fold this sheet once and hold it out of the cubicle. When all
participants are done the sheets will be collected. Afterwards the questionnaire will be
handed out to you. We ask you to carefully answer the questions.
{} = Indicate the phrase that is exclusively employed in the respective treatment, [Indi-
vidual] or [Team].
8